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Race and the 
Global Political 
Economy
By Winston E. Langley
Last September, news reports in­formed the world that the prime minister of Japan. Yasuhiro Nakasone, had attributed to the number of minorities 
in the US. — specifically Afro-Americans. 
Puerto Ricans and Mexicans — the reason 
for a claimed lower intelligence level on the 
part of Americans when compared with 
Japanese.
Reactions to the reported statement 
were immediate, with some commentators 
emphasizing the fact that Japan had become 
rather certain of itself and that the prime 
minister k statement only reflects the coun­
try's growing pride in its economic and 
technical achievements. Some commen­
tators posited Tokyok 250 years of the 
Tokugawa Shogunate — which closed 
Japank doors to foreigners and helped to 
foster among Japanese a sense of 
uniqueness — while others contended that 
the offending statement bespeaks the per­
ception on the part of many in Japan that the 
latter’s former mentor, the United States, is
a nation in decline, that is "riddled with 
social and economic problems."1
There is another position — one that 
looks to the subnational. Here reference is 
made to the intolerance that some Japanese 
allegedly exhibit toward minorities, the 
Koreans for example. It is argued, 
Nakasones statement is symtomatic of the 
attitudes which inform that claimed intol­
erance. Further, the subnational focus 
holds, while the national government itself 
may not advocate it as an outlook, there is a 
sense among many Japanese that the post­
war economic success of their country is 
directly related to Japan’s ethnic homoge­
neity.2
The two orientations which have charac­
terized the reaction of commentators, both 
in the US. and Japan, share two common 
properties: they imply that the prime 
minister of Japan made a racial slur against 
America and some Americans, an implica­
tion which Nakasone in his official apology 
to the U.S. government denies.3 Secondly, 
they- do not question the validity of the 
claim contained in the reported statement, 
as if there were a tacit agreement that the 
claim is accurate but was in poor taste to 
have publicly asserted it.
Regardless of the importance of the 
above speculated-on motives or forces that 
may have caused the troubling statement, 
tiie issue of central significance is being 
overlooked. And that is: the issue of race in 
die contemporary global political economy. 
This essay will focus on the race issue after
a brief historical sketch in which the U.S., 
because of its dominant role in the global 
economy since 1945, will be featured.
Pre-1945
One need not recapitulate here the role of 
race in supporting the enslavement of Afro- 
Americans or in shaping the political econ­
omy of the United States. One, however, 
should recall that after the Civil War — 
especially in the 1880s and 1890s — there 
was considerable debate in the US. about 
what the sociopolitical standing of Blacks 
should be. Although they could not be 
regarded as the equal of whites — the legal 
principle of equality before the law notwith­
standing — the labor of Blacks was a 
necessary predicate to economic advance­
ment for all. The answer to Uus dilemma 
resided in a form of benevolent accom­
modation — one which would allow indus­
trial training for Blacks, a measure of 
disapproval on their being physically 
abused, including being lynched, and for­
malized racial division. Added thereto was 
the call for cooperation between leaders of 
the two racial communities to promote 
improved race relations, which became 
more pronounced during and after World 
War I.
Paralleling the above development were 
two others: the fear of assimilation between 
the races at home; the concern for the type 
of racial relationship that the US. would 
have to entertain abroad if her economic 
ambitions were to be adequately satisfied.
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In case of the former, which expressed itelf 
in terms of "homogeneity." "racial purity." 
or "racial integrity."4 it was a fear among 
whites that the race to which they belonged 
could undergo a form of debilitating stagna­
tion. Why? Blacks were said to be inferior in 
such fundamental qualities as intelligence, 
enterprise, initiative and creativity. Since 
these differences between the races were 
perceived to be permanent, the mixing of 
the races through intermarriage could only 
result in an increase in the intellectually 
inferior and the erosion of the prospects for 
the progress of the American civilization. 
(A minority viewpoint, which one author 
calls cultural environmentalism,5 con­
tended that the differences were not genetic 
— "permanent" -  and could be eliminated 
over time to ensure an equalitarian so­
ciety).
In the case of international relations, the 
domestic racial sentiments in the U.S. found 
strong expression, but in a more complex 
form. On the one hand, one finds the settled 
aversion to mixing with non-white races 
south of the Rio Grande — “Latin race 
mixed with Indian and African blood."''’ It 
was this aversion which, in large part, 
informed the decision of the U.S. not to 
incorporate all of Mexico in 1848 and which, 
in the 1870s, effectively undermined Presi­
dent Grant 5  efforts to annex the Domin­
ican Republic.
On the other hand, one finds a restless 
nation in the 1890s. especially after the 
panic of 1893-94. which is being told that
the U.S. is threatened with decline unless it 
expands and meets an emerging economic 
competition that all vigorous nations must 
win if they are to survive. (These were the 
last days of Europe’s partition of Africa, of 
European, Russian and Japanese expansion 
into China, and the Spanish empire.) In­
deed. from the political rhetoric of The­
odore Roosevelt to the scholarly pen of 
Brooks Adams, one finds the same counsel.
For Roosevelt, the U.S. could not avoid 
taking Hawaii, Cuba, Puerto Rico, and the 
Philippines. In the 20th century, with the 
emergence of many nations, if the US. 
stood idly by and sought "ease and ignoble 
peace," he claimed, or if it shrank from “the 
hard contests where men must win at the 
hazard of their lives. . .  then the bolder and 
the stronger peoples will pass us by, and will 
win for themselves the domination of the 
world."7
For Adams, the energy of a vigorous 
people — Americans as well as others — is 
manifested in war or economic competition; 
and when a centralized society "disinte­
grates under the pressure of economic 
competition, it is because the energy of the 
race has been exhausted.""
Was the U.S. disintegrating or was it 
possessed of the requisite vigor to challenge 
others?
Those who sought expansion won. But it 
came in the face of considerable pessimism 
over the perceived challenge which the non­
white races would pose to the “Anglo-Saxon 
races” (in the U.S. this phrase was fre­
quently used) and to those of the Christian 
faith. The pessimism was warranted for 
people like Edgar Murphy, a leading accom- 
modationist. He noted that everywhere the 
former “coalition of weaker groups is being 
broken up. and the inferior peoples are 
being . . .  reorganized . . .  (into) stronger 
aggregates: and that the co-existence of 
whites and non-whites under such condi­
tions posed problems of vast proportions— 
"problems of the strong living with the 
weak . . .  so living as to assure peace 
without afflicting desolation, as to preserve 
order without defeating justice, as to uphold 
a  s ta te  w h ich  w ill  exp ress  th e  life  o f  th e  
h ig h e r  g ro u p  without enfeebling or destroy­
ing that waiting manhood of the weaker 
peoples which itself craves and deserves 
expression."9
Murphys solution and the one followed 
by the US. was to replicate abroad what was 
practiced at home: benevolent accommoda­
tion, not equality. So the people of Hawaii, 
Panama, Puerto Rico, the Philippines and 
Cuba, for example, would be helped to 
acquire minimal skills — skills necessary to 
help the U.S. deal with economic competi­
tion with other countries; and indigenous 
leaders would be recruited to collaborate 
with their white counterparts to urge racial 
harmony and solidarity: In no case, how­
ever, would the notion of equality be 
accepted. This was the operating policy 
from the 1890s — one that also guided 
President Wilson.
As the moral and political leader at the
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Paris Peace Conference of 1919-20 — that 
important conference which concluded the 
peace treaty with Germany, formed the 
League of Nations and sought to shape a 
new world order — Wilson, who had called 
upon people during the war to fight so that 
the world could be made safe for democracy, 
sought to lead that new order. He even 
became the principal advocate of the right 
to self-determination; yet he rejected 
Japan’s call, at the Paris conference, for an 
endorsement of the principle of racial 
equality. It was that policy which fashioned 
22 U.S. behavior during the 1930s and the 
early years of the 1940s.
Post-1945
The time from 1945 to the 1960s witnessed 
some changes in the racial policies in the 
U.S. — changes which gave the cultural 
environmentalists an apparent ascendency. 
It is these changes that sponsored the 
domestic civil rights legislation at home 
and. to a degree, urged a more supportive 
stand on human rights abroad. These 
changes, however, were not without consid­
erable struggle.
Despite the racial doctrines which in­
formed some of the horrors committed 
during World War II; in spite of the high, 
moral-sounding themes of instruments 
such as the Atlantic Charter (the August 14. 
1941 joint declaration of principles by 
Roosevelt and Churchill that promised a 
j u s t  and stable world after the war); and 
even in face of the remarkable constitution 
of the United Nations Educational. Scien­
tific, and Cultural Organization (UN­
ESCO),10 attempts to remove the issue of 
race from p u b lic  debate were more of a 
tactical move than a conviction about the 
equality of racial groups.
Support for the latter conclusion can be 
found in, among others, the expressed 
attitude of governments during the period 
in question. Before the issuance of the 
Atlantic Charter, the British Foreign Office 
had prepared a memorandum on the ques­
tion of race. It noted the difficulty of 
maintaining racial discrimination in the 
world as it then stood — after all, people of 
varying racial backgrounds were being 
asked to sacrifice everything, including 
their lives, to fight against Nazism.
The statement went on to note, however, 
that it would be unwise to raise the issue 
since, among other things, the Americans 
did not believe in racial equality, and to 
inject the subject into international debate 
would have the effect of jeopardizing Wash­
ington's economic assistance to Britain. 
This is not to suggest that Britain had a 
more progressive outlook on the issue of 
race. Churchills reaction to the g e n e ra l  
statements about human rights in the 
Atlantic Charter included the position that 
such statements of rights implied no com­
mitment concerning London's policies 
within its own colonies.11
Even more compelling was the reaction 
to some proposals by China at the San 
Francisco Conference which drafted the 
United Nations Charter. What Japan was to 
the Paris Peace Conference, in respect to 
tlie racial issue, China was to San Francisco. 
Peking, which had even before the latter 
conference sought to have the major states 
take a position on racial discrimination, 
become 3 focal point of concern. New 
Zealand, fearing an influx of non-whites, 
was worried that China would call for 
formal recognition of the principle of racial 
equality; so. too, was Australia. The U.S. at 
first—in the person of its Secretary of State 
Edward Stettinius — while acknowledging 
the need for "g rea te r  fr e e d o m  a n d  g re a te r  
o p p o r tu n ity  for all peoples of every race,”11 
was not prepared to support such a formal 
recognition. Congress, in particular, was 
anxious about the impact of any such 
recognition on domestic race relations.
China, unlike Japan which stood alone at 
the Paris conference, had support. And it 
was the swelling of this support — from 
Brazil. India, Mexico, the Philippines. Cuba 
and Egypt — that influenced the scope of 
the human rights and for fundamental 
freedoms for a l l  w i th o u t  d is t in c t io n  a s  to  
race. sex. language or religion."13
The U.S. sought protection from, among 
other things, the implications of this human 
rights threat by limiting the ability of the 
UN. to interfere within its domestic juris­
diction.14 even though it gave general 
support to the adoption in 1948 of the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
(UDHR) and, in 1966, to the International 
Covenants on Human Rights. South Africa, 
too. led by Jan C. Smuts, took the lead in 
supporting the idea of human rights at the 
risk of contradicting Smuts’ previous stand.
“In 1945." observed W.E.B. Du Bois. 
"Jan Smuts, prime minister of South Africa, 
who had once declared that every white 
man in South Africa believes in the suppres­
sion of the Negro except those who are 
'mad. quite mad’, stood before the as­
sembled peoples of the world and pleaded 
for an article on ‘human rights' in the 
United Nations Charter. Nothing so vividly 
illustrates the twisted contradiction of
thought in the minds of white men.”14
A s noted before, the cultural environ­mentalists appeared, after WW II, to have gained some ascendency over 
the geneticists who saw Blacks and other 
minorities as permanently inferior to 
whites — an ascendency which informed 
much of the changes in civil rights legisla­
tion. By the middle and late 1960s, however, 
matters had begun to change, and the 
geneticists began to reclaim their former 
public standing.
The issue took on world-wide academic 
significance when Arthur Jensen, a promi­
nent American educational psychologist, 
released what he claimed was the result of a 
project he had conducted among children of 
different racial groups. His report, pub­
lished in the H a r v a r d  E d u c a t ia u i l  R e ­
v ie w }*  contended that intelligence is 
largely hereditary and is not susceptible to 
material alteration by the environment. 
Further, like his prominent predecessor of 
the 1920s, CarlC. Brigham, who contended 
that American n a t i o m l  intelligence would 
decline more rapidly than that of “European 
national groups, owing to the presence here 
of the Negro,"17 Jensen claimed that Blacks 
in the U.S. tended to inbreed hereditary 
defects and this depresses their genetic 
potential more than whites.
Views similar to those of Jensens, includ­
ing those of William Shockly, and Professor 
Wesley Grilz George.1" were expressed 
before and have been subjected to some 
formidable dissensions. Despite the dis­
senting opinions Jensen's thesis attracted 
and its vigorous refutation by Professor 
Jerome S. Kagan of Harvard University,19 it 
nonetheless gained academic respectability 
and governed the thinking within many 
“respectable quarters” during the '70s. It is 
prevalent in those very quarters today.
Race and Political Economy
Between 1945 and the middle of the 1960s, 
for all its problems, the U.S. economy was 
able to sustain what John Kenneth Galbraith 
aptly called the affluent society. With that 
affluence — and within tolerable social and 
racial advancement — people experienced 
an improvement in their material circum­
stances. And wfhen employment and other 
factors of social dislocation interrupted, a 
cushion of federal intervention could be 
favorably invoked. Funds were available. 
Even in the midst of a Vietnam War that was 
bleeding the treasury, "guns and butter" 
were deemed to be affordable, and the 
Johnson administration initiated steps to­
ward what he called the Great Society —
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one in which, among other things, material 
poverty would be no more. Those years also 
witnessed the greatest progress in civil 
rights legislation. Then matters began to 
change.
By 1973. the ofl crisis shook the U.S. 
economy to its foundations, threatening the 
national standard erf living; and the following 
year. Third World states collectively called 
for a New International Economic Order 
(NIEO). In the meantime, controversies 
arose over affirmative action programs. 
Conflicts emerged within unions whose 
last-hired, first-fired policies weighed un­
favorably on the overwhelming majority of 
the last-hired who were non-whites. People 
began to seek ways, in face of rising inflation 
and increasing welfare expenditures, to 
reduce government expenditures. Psychol­
ogist Gordon Allport has observed that 
downward mobility, periods of unemploy­
ment and depression as well as general 
economic dissatisfaction are all positively 
correlated with prejudice/’0 
The preceding does not suggest that 
Jensens thesis induced or was induced by 
these developments. Rather, it merely coin­
cided with and was part of what was taking 
place — restoring racial sentiments to the 
public forum in which they were always 
present but not always visibly active.
T he U.S. came out of World War II determined to use its economic ad­vantage to structure the global econ­
omy to its benefit. The latter, according to 
Dean Acheson, who later became secretary 
of state, could be achieved by looking 
outside the U.S.. "to other markets and 
those markets are abroad."21 In more 
concrete terms. William Clayton, assistant 
secretary of state for economic affairs, told 
a congressional committee in March 1945 
that if the U.S. wanted a relatively high level 
of employment and a national income in the 
neighborhood of $150 billion, it would have 
to sell about $10 billion worth of goods. “In 
other words." he said, “we’ve got to export 
three times as much as we exported before 
the war if we are to keep our industry- 
running somewhere near capacity."22 (This 
near capacity would allow for a high level of 
employment). But how. in specific terms, 
were such goals to be realized? Through 
something called multilateral trade, of 
course.
The latter, in combination with the World 
Bank and the International Monetary Fund 
— frequently called the Bretton Wxxis 
system after the place in New Hampshire 
where the 1944 Monetary and Financial 
Conference took place — entailed a two­
pronged approach. The Fund, for example, 
was to ensure trade stability by providing 
needed foreign exchange: and the Bank was 
to improve the climate for international 
investment.
T he main thrust, however, entailed a two-pronged approach to global eco­nomic relationships: 1) breaking down 
all exclusive economic ties which states had 
previously arranged among themselves; 2) 
opening up all sectors of a nations economy 
to private enterprise in such a way that all 
other nations would have an equal chance to 
enter into trade and other relations with it. 
Because the U.S. was the most powerful 
nation (and the one least negatively affected 
by the war), that equality was really un­
equal.
The reasoning in Washington was that in 
an economic system as the one it sought to 
create, while others would derive some 
benefits, the U.S. would enjoy the most. 
Indeed, this was true for a period. The 
question then, for the U.S was: How could 
such a policy be implemented? How could 
the U.S. persuade non-Westem nation­
states to support its interest and. more 
generally, the ideology implied in that 
interest. Certainly not with any overt or 
otherwise detectable international expres­
sion of racism. Such behavior would be. as 
understated by one scholar.23 a liability. 
Thus, the economic concerns of 1944-45 
overcame certain racial anxieties and de­
manded a tactical support for the principle 
of racial equality.
The multilateral system is that which 
supported the affluent society; because of 
the preponderant power the U.S. exercised 
within it. it also created a false sense that 
America was “economically independent of 
the outside world, while the outside (world 
was) extremely dependent on the U.S"24 
And. in part, because of that false sense, the 
U.S. has been unable to admit certain 
economic weaknesses. For example, the 
U.S. could not admit that it was dependent 
on Third World states and that “foreign aid" 
was part of the national interest. Such aid 
was for a long time characterized by some 
Americans as “give-aways" to "backward" 
people.
Even though by the middle of the 1960s a 
growing European Economic Community 
(EEC) and a vigorous Japan were beginning 
to give the U.S. considerable challenge 
within the global economic system that the 
US. had designed, one still heard such 
claims as “when America sneezes, Europe 
catches pneumonia" or that the Japanese do 
not create anything; they merely copy or
borrow from U.S. technology.
The EEC and Japan nevertheless contin­
ued an unabating challenge to the U.S. 
which, though enjoying sturdy earnings 
from foreign investments and international 
banking operations, found itself having 
balance of payments problems. By the late 
1960s, the Nixon administration sought to 
pressure America's major trading partners 
to make certain concessions by unilaterally 
weakening the Bretton Woods system. 
However, the partners were not forthcom­
ing.
With plant closings, inflation and rising 23 
unemployment during the late 1970s. the 
editors of B u s in e s s  W eek, in 1980, sounded 
the alarm that the U.S. had sustained 
"precipitous loss of competitiveness (in) the 
last 15 rears," of which the wave of plant 
closings was but the most vivid manifesta­
tion; that the economy must “undergo a 
fu n d a m e n ta l  change if it is to retain a 
m ea su re  o f  v ia b ility  let 3lone leadership in 
the remaining 20 years of this century;" and 
that the goal must be "nothing less than a 
reindustrialization of America.”"-
The call for reindustrialization was in 
accord with a theme that was being raised 
by some:26 that the growth in the loss of 
manufacturing jobs by the U.S. was not part 
of the usual business cycle but the expres­
sion of a permanent loss of basic industries 
caused by foreign competition. In other 
words, America was being d e - in d u s ­
tr ia lised .
In the midst of these developments. 
Third World countries — that group which 
was expected to remain “fragmented and 
dependent" in the words of former national 
security advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski, and 
from which "nothing important can 
come."27 in the words of Henry Kissinger— 
challenged what had been left of the 
economic system created by the US. in 
1944-45. In 1964, through the United 
Nations Conference on Trade and Develop­
ment (UNCTADX Third World natioas did 
what Murphy in the late 19th century had 
feared: they began to organize as a bloc in 
order to make effective demands for a 
change in what they considered the "brutal 
ground rules" of international economic 
relations. It was not until a decade later, 
however, under their proposed NIEO that a 
comprehensive program was presented to 
industrial states in general, and the U.S. in 
particular.
Coming as it did a year after the oil 
embargo by oil-exporting states in the 
Middle East, the U.S. was in trouble. 
Attempts were made in varying fora to
M W 0 lM C T M )N S J U lV 1 9 « 7
4
New Directions, Vol. 14 [], Iss. 3, Art. 7
http://dh.howard.edu/newdirections/vol14/iss3/7
negotiate some compromises but all proved 
unavailing. During the Carter administra­
tion. a plan was devised for a North-South 
conference to be held in Cancun, Mexico, in 
1981, with the hope that it would yield some 
economic concessions from the North. 
Indeed, the U.S. began to place emphasis on 
what one may call managerialism. The 
latter, sponsored by the Trilateral Commis­
sion (composed of influential American. 
European, and Japanese leaders) espouses 
cooperation, partnership, collaboration in 
the handling of an interdependent world, 
w instead of confrontation and unilateral deci­
sion-making.
The conference in Cancun—attended by 
President Reagan rather than Carter—was 
a failure because Reagan felt that the entire 
ideological premise of the NIEO was wrong 
(for it emphasized government interven­
tion in the economy) and, as such, could not 
commend itself to concessions from the 
U.S. in particular, and the North in general. 
But Third World states have been no less 
determined to act as one in order to effect 
changes in the global economic structure.
The erosion of the U.S. industrial capac­
ity continued in such a manner that by 1985, 
for the first time in more than 70 years, the 
U.S. became a debtor nation. And the 
financing of the national deficit came from 
borrowing, principally from the Japanese. 
By August of 1986, Jeffrey Garten of 
Shearson Lehman Brothers spoke in terms 
of America "going begging to West Ger­
man)’ and Japan."*8
In economic terms, the U.S. is caught in a 
bind. Only a basic reorientation can provide 
any long-term help. Lowering interest rates 
can help, but only marginally. So. too, can 
devaluating the dollar. Urging Japan and 
Germany to purchase more American 
goods under the threat of using tariffs to 
keep out their products may be appealing to 
the uninformed but will do little else, since 
those countries account for no more than 10 
and 4 percent, respectively, of American 
exports.
Assuming that they wish to purchase 
more American goods, what will the U.S. 
sell them? As Garten points out: it cannot 
be steel, since American steel companies 
are in poor shape: not agricultural goods, 
there is a world-wide glut: and in the 
semiconductor and computer industries, 
imports will continue to capture an in­
creased share of the domestic market. In 
the latter regard, the Joint Economic Com­
mittee of Congress had predicted that the 
high-technology sector of the economy 
from which the U.S. had a $27 billion trade
surplus in 1980, will suffer a $2 billion 
deficit in 1986. -  Even the financial center is 
shifting from New York to Tokyo, with the 
latter's investment banks replacing Amer­
ica's.
It is within the context of a nation-state 
which finds it difficult to admit its own 
weakness, which is no longer strong enough 
to force its major trading partners to act as 
it would prefer, which finds even the pre­
viously disorganized Third World unaccept­
ing of its prescriptions for international 
economic order,30 and which finds tradi­
tional alternatives non-responsive to its 
problems, that one must reexamine the 
statement of the Japanese prime minister.
An America, finding itself fallen from its 
exalted economic standing of the 1950s — 
and even early 1960s—began asking: Why? 
What is the cause of this decline? Con­
currently another question began to be 
posed: What is the reason for the success of 
Japan? The answer frequently given is the 
education and skills of the Japanese people.
When one speaks of the skills and the 
literacy of the Japanese, however, one 
should not think in traditional terms of the 
capacity simply to read and write. What 
Galbraith as early as 1967 called the "edu­
cational and scientific estate"—that body of 
educators and research scientists as well as 
engineers who. when combined with civil 
servants, journalists and writers, create the 
basis for the new industrial state—would be 
more appropriate.31
Inasmuch as the expression "educational 
and scienfitic estate" connotes a degree of 
elitism, one must urge a broader social view. 
Japan has been mobilizing its educational 
system as its principal industry, with the 
view that what will determine the future 
economic power of states is not so much 
gold, territory, savings or capital, but the 
skill of its population, People must be able to 
piaster — interpret, absorb, process, store, 
and transmit — vast bodies of information. 
No longer, for example, will nations be able 
to succeed economically while hiding the 
illiteracy of their populations.
In looking at Japan's success in this rising 
information age. people began to compare it 
with the U.S. The weakness of the US., it 
has been claimed, has been the lack of skills 
among its population. And the c h ie f  c a u s e  of 
America's economic decline, therefore, has 
been the large number of unskilled people, 
especially minorities. So the very v ic t im  of 
domestic racial discrimination is now the 
cause, in the eyes of many, of America's 
economic weakness. When the Japanese 
prime minister made the statement, there­
fore, he was not saying anything novel; he 
was merely repeating what had been said 
time and again in influential circles within 
the U.S.
Past, Present and Future
From the above historical sketch, one 
should perceive at least two patterns: First, 
that just as many white Americans have 
found it difficult to envision a truly multi­
racial n a tio n a l  society, so, too, have they 
found it problematic to conceive of a gen­
uinely multiracial in te r n a tio n a l  society.
To meet the economic 
challenge, the U.S. must 
seek to have a society 
which enjoys social 
solidarity and is highly 
skilled.
Second, on each occasion when racial 
antipathies have come into conflict with 
economic aspirations, a "tactical fix" — no 
effort to find a real solution—in the area of 
the former would be effected in order to 
successfully pursue the latter. Neither of 
these two patterns can be continued much 
longer without causing irreparable harm to 
the national as well as the international 
community.
People have become more negatively 
sensitized by racial prejudice, and the global 
village makes it increasingly difficult, if not 
impossible, to disguise its expression. 
Racism, as indicated by Paul Erlich and. to a 
degree borne out by the November (1986) 
issue of S o u th ,3'  has become no less 
dangerous than a bomb; and it can explode 
at any time. So what might be a path to a 
solution?
The first step for the U.S. is to recognize 
that the economic challenge it faces is one 
that, in all likelihood, will become more 
formidable. That challenge will come from 
China. India. South Korea, Brazil (from 
Europe, too) and. even more, from Japan. 
The latter aspires to economic control of 
the 21 si century through its ascendency in 
technology. If matters continue as they have 
the past 15 years or so, Japan could very 
well achieve its aim.
The second and most important step is 
for Washington to realize that it cannot
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meet successfully this economic challenge 
unless it takes fundamental action to solve 
its racial problem. And this must be done 
both at home and abroad. True, there are 
other difficulties — corporate short-term 
planning and the overwhelming emphasis 
on military research, to name but a few — 
with which the U.S. must successfully 
wrestle.
In case of the military emphasis, while 
the U.S. has been harnessing most of its 
available technical brainpower to engage in 
military research and development, the 
Japanese have been focusing on Chilian 
technology, thus, advancing ahead of the 
U.S. in fields such as solar energy, semicon­
ductors. biotechnology, robotics, ceramics 
and supercomputers.13 As important as 
these other problems are, however, they are 
not as crucial as the racial one.
To meet the economic challenge, the U.S. 
must seek to have a society which enjoys 
social solidarity and is highly skilled. But 
social solidarity cannot be purchased by a 
replication of past tactical maneuvers; it can 
come only as a result of a genuine commit­
ment to a multiracial society based on 
equality. As such, the law — useful as it is — 
cannot be the principal tool; Americans 
must resort to the cultural instrument 
which, hopefully, will sponsor a renaissance 
in Blinking and attitudes.
The pervasiveness of the cultural will 
expresses itself in even' sphere of life — 
from the image conveyed of groups on 
television and in novels—to the disposition 
one holds with respect to one’s problems. In 
the midst of this search for solidarity, a 
comprehensive system of education must 
be introduced to inculcate skills to interpret 
and use ones environment. As used here, 
“skills" should not be equated with tech­
nical aptitudes only; it entails those broader 
cultural abilities that will make the society 
a s  a  w ho le  a dwelling in which each person 
will have his or her capabilities elicited to 
the fullest extent. With the traditional 
alienation or constant injury to the dignity 
of minority groups removed, they too. in a 
few generations, will exhibit skills compara­
ble to others.
Internationally, the changed attitude 
would yield returns that should be most 
favorable. Not only would the U.S. become a 
model in a multiracial world, but it would 
open up a fruitful interchange with the less 
developed countries (LDCs). The inter­
change that springs from the spirit which 
claims that “nothing important can come" 
from those countries would be replaced by 
one which is prepared to examine their
concerns on their own merits. And this 
would have a reverberating effect — from 
Third World proposals for a NIEO in the 
U.N. and the latter’s associate institutions 
such as UNESCO. Inasmuch as the future 
economic growth of LDCs will have the 
greatest impact on the future global econ­
omy. it does not take much imagination to 
grasp the extent to which the prospects for 
the United States’ economic leadership 
rests on its relations with those nations.
The present, therefore, discouraging as 
it appears sometimes, offers two pos­
sibilities for the future: America can seek to 
remove the disease of racial prejudice and, 
in so doing, harness itself to confront 
international economic challenges — not 
because race should be used as an instru­
ment of economic objectives but because 
those challenges offer an opportunity for an 
overall reappraisal and transformation. Or 
America can follow its current course, 
preserve the disease in its social womb and 
face the shock of economic backwardness. 
In the latter event, “scapegoats" — nation­
ally and subnationally — will be looked for, 
and the U.S. may not be 3ble, materially, to 
distinguish itself from Nazi German): Inter­
nationally, there may be war — a trade war. 
first, and perhaps even a military confronta­
tion — with Japan. □  *i7
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